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SHE’S GOT A TICKET TO RIDE: THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT’S DETERMINATION IN SACHS v. 
REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA THAT A TICKET SALE 
BY A COMMON LAW AGENT ABROGATES A 
FOREIGN STATE-OWNED COMMON 
CARRIER’S SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Abstract: On December 6, 2013, in Sachs v. Republic of Austria, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a foreign state-owned 
common carrier carries on commercial activity in the United States when it sells 
rail passes through a United States ticket agent. In so holding, the court expand-
ed the scope of jurisdiction over foreign state-owned entities to include claims 
arising from transactions with common law agents of  foreign states. This Com-
ment argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly applied principles of agency law to 
foreign state-owned common carriers acting through domestic ticket agents, and 
that, on review, the U.S. Supreme Court should hold the same. Further, this 
Comment urges Congress to articulate a uniform standard to avoid inconsisten-
cies between the common law in various states. 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) prescribes the sole 
means by which a United States court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign 
state.1 A foreign state enjoys jurisdictional immunity from suit in the United 
States unless the complained-of conduct meets one of the statute’s exceptions 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012) (“[A] foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States and of the States except as provided [by the exceptions] in this chap-
ter.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610 
(explaining that the FSIA establishes the “sole and exclusive standards” for determining whether a 
foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity). Historically, the common law extended complete 
immunity to foreign sovereigns, but as interactions between nations changed over time, a more 
qualified approach to foreign sovereign immunity became appropriate. See Doe v. Holy See, 557 
F.3d 1066, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 
116, 137 (1812)). Initially, exceptions to immunity were decided through an ad hoc system of U.S. 
Department of State recommendations. See id. (recounting this state of affairs). In 1976, Congress 
enacted the FSIA to provide a comprehensive set of rules governing sovereign immunity and ex-
ceptions thereto. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611); see Holy See, 557 F.3d at 1071–72 (explaining the history 
of United States sovereign immunity policy). 
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to immunity.2 One such exception is for claims arising from a foreign state’s 
commercial acts.3 Under the FSIA, sovereign immunity is abrogated when a 
plaintiff brings a claim based upon a foreign state’s commercial act carried on 
in the United States.4  
In April 2007, an American tourist sustained severe injuries while at-
tempting to board a train in Innsbruck, Austria, resulting in the amputation of 
both legs above the knee.5 The tourist brought a tort action in the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California seeking compensation from the 
rail system for her injuries.6 The rail system, however, is owned and operated 
by the Republic of Austria and thus enjoys a presumption of sovereign im-
munity under the FSIA.7 In 2013, in Sachs v. Republic of Austria (“Sachs 
III”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on rehearing en banc, 
concluded that a foreign state-owned common carrier carries on commercial 
activity in the United States when it sells rail passes through a domestic ticket 
agent.8 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that a United States court has 
jurisdiction over claims arising from the ticket sale.9  
                                                                                                                           
 2 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604–1605. The most common exceptions include (1) the commercial 
activity exception, (2) the tortious activity exception, and (3) the terrorism exception. See id. 
§§ 1605(a)(2), 1605(a)(5), 1605A. 
 3 Id. § 1605(a)(2); accord H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6605 (explaining that sovereign immunity under the FSIA is restricted to suits arising from a for-
eign state’s public acts (“jure imperii”) and does not extend to suits involving a foreign state’s 
commercial acts (“jure gestionis”)). 
 4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 5 See Sachs v. Republic of Austria (Sachs I), No. C 08-1840 VRW, 2011 WL 816854, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2011), aff’d, 695 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 737 F.3d 584 (9th 
Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom, OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 135 S.Ct. 1172 (2015). 
 6 See id. 
 7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); Sachs I, 2011 WL 816854, at *4 (ruling that a foreign-state 
owned rail provider enjoys sovereign immunity); see also Sachs v. Republic of Austria (Sachs II), 
695 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding this ruling), rev’d en banc, 737 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 
2013), cert. granted sub nom, OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 135 S.Ct. 1172 (2015).  
 8 See 737 F.3d 584, 587–88 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (overturning the panel court decision 
which held that no agency relationship existed between the ticket agent and the rail system), cert. 
granted sub nom, OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 135 S.Ct. 1172 (2015); see also James E. 
Berger & Charlene C. Sun, 9th Circ. Clarifies ‘Commercial Activity’ Under FSIA, LAW360, (Jan. 6, 
2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/2014articles/1-6-
14_Law360.pdf, archived at, http://perma.cc/6AMN-M5E5. The en banc majority and dissent disa-
greed over the legal standard to apply to determine whether the domestic ticket agent was in fact an 
agent of the foreign state-owned rail system for purposes of whether the latter carried on commercial 
activity in the United States. Compare Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 593–94 (majority opinion) (holding that 
common law principles of agency should govern), with id. at 605–07 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) 
(urging application of the FSIA’s definition of agency, or in the alternative, the standard announced 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in First National City Bank v. Banco El Comercio Exterior de Cuba 
(“Bancec”), 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983)). 
 9 Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 587. Under the FSIA, where the commercial activity exception is met, 
a United States court has subject matter jurisdiction over a party’s claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 
(2012). Whether the FSIA also confers personal jurisdiction over a claim remains contested. See 
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 This Comment suggests that common law agency offers the best ap-
proach for determining whether acts of a purported agent can be imputed to a 
foreign state-owned common carrier.10 Part I of this Comment provides an 
overview of the FSIA commercial activity exception and discusses the factual 
and procedural history of the Sachs III decision.11 Part II of this Comment 
examines three proposed standards for evaluating when a foreign state carries 
on commercial activity through an agent.12 Finally, Part III of this Comment 
concludes that common law agency principles best align with legislative in-
tent and important policy goals, but acknowledges that Congress should clari-
fy the issue to attain uniformity in application.13 
I. THE FSIA AND PLAINTIFF’S INJURY ABROAD 
The FSIA outlines various exceptions to sovereign immunity.14 An ex-
ception is provided for claims based upon a foreign state’s commercial activi-
ty.15 Section A of this Part first explains the history behind, and elements of, 
the FSIA commercial activity exception.16 Section B then describes the 
events leading to Plaintiff’s injury in the Sachs case.17 Finally, Section C ex-
plores the case’s journey through the courts.18  
                                                                                                                           
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 13–14, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6612 (citing Int’l Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)) (stating that the FSIA acts, in effect, as “a Federal long-
arm statute over foreign states,” and noting that, “[t]he requirements of minimum jurisdictional 
contacts and adequate notice are embodied in the provision,” and that, “[t]hese immunity provi-
sions . . . prescribe the necessary contacts which must exist before our courts can exercise personal 
jurisdiction”). But compare Frontera Res. Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azerbaijan 
Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 396–98 (2d Cir. 2009) (no minimum contacts analysis required), and 
Price v. Socialist People’s Lybian Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 95–100 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same), 
with Theo H. Davis & Co. v. Republic of the Marshall Islands, 174 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(requiring satisfaction of traditional minimum contacts analysis before personal jurisdiction is 
proper), and Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1529 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). See generally 
Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffrey Atik, Politics and Personal Jurisdiction: Suing State Sponsors of 
Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 87 GEO. L.J. 
675 (1999) (questioning whether federal courts would have personal jurisdiction over a foreign 
state defendant sued under the terrorism exception to the FSIA).  
 10 See infra notes 89–107 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–54 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 55–88 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 89–107 and accompanying text. 
 14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012). 
 15 Id. § 1605(a)(2).  
 16 See infra notes 19–29 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 30–42 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 43–54 and accompanying text. 
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A. The FSIA Commercial Activity Exception 
The FSIA prescribes the means by which a United States plaintiff may 
bring suit against a foreign state, including an agency or instrumentality there-
of (collectively, “foreign state”), in a domestic forum.19 The FSIA provides 
the sole basis for obtaining subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign state.20 
Until 1952, United States’ policy was one of total sovereign immunity, prem-
ised on the reciprocal notion that foreign sovereigns were coequals.21 In 1952, 
however, the United States adopted a policy of restrictive sovereign immunity 
that limited grants of immunity to suits involving the public acts of a foreign 
state.22 In 1976, the policy of restrictive sovereign immunity was codified in 
the FSIA.23 
Under the FSIA, sovereign immunity is presumed.24 The FSIA, howev-
er, outlines several statutory exceptions that, if met, abrogate immunity and 
afford a United States court subject matter jurisdiction over claims against a 
foreign state-defendant.25 One exception is for claims based upon a foreign 
state’s commercial activity.26 A United States federal court will have subject 
matter jurisdiction over a foreign state where, (1) the foreign state engaged in 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603–1605.  
 20 Id. §§ 1330, 1604; Arg. Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989) 
(explaining that Congress intended the FSIA to serve as the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction 
over a foreign state in United States’ courts”). 
 21 See The Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137 (“This full and absolute territorial jurisdic-
tion being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extra-territorial 
power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as objects.”). See 
generally Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the Construc-
tion of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 616–17 (2010) (explaining the origins of sovereign 
immunity). 
 22 See Holy See, 557 F.3d at 1071 (explaining the origins of the FSIA). 
 23 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611); see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6605 (explaining the policy of restrictive sovereign immunity). 
 24 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604. 
 25 Id. §§ 1330, 1605; see supra note 2 (introducing the most commonly used FSIA exceptions). 
 26 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). There are in fact three discrete ways to meet the FSIA commercial 
activity exception. Id. This Comment will only address the commercial activity exception defined 
in the first clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) that provides: “A foreign state shall not be immune 
from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which the 
action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state.” 
See id. The other two ways to meet the commercial activity exception include where an act is 
performed in the United States in connection with commercial activity conducted abroad, and 
where an act is performed outside the United States in connection with commercial activity con-
ducted abroad that has a direct effect in the United States. See id.; see also 14A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3662.3 (4th ed. 
2014).  
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commercial activity,27 (2) the commercial activity was carried on in the Unit-
ed States,28 and (3) the claims are based upon that commercial activity.29    
B. Purchase of Eurail Pass and Subsequent Injuries 
In March 2007, Plaintiff Carol P. Sachs (“Sachs”) purchased a Eurail 
pass from The Rail Pass Experts (“RPE”) for use on her then-upcoming trip 
to Eastern Europe.30 Although RPE is an American company with offices in 
Massachusetts, Sachs purchased her Eurail pass via RPE’s website.31 Sachs is 
a resident of California.32  
 The passenger rail system in Austria is operated by OBB Personen-
verkehr AG (“OBB”), a state-owned entity.33 OBB, like many European 
transportation providers, is a member of the Eurail Group, an association re-
sponsible for marketing and selling Eurail passes to United States residents.34 
Although OBB disputes that RPE was an authorized agent of the Eurail 
Group or an authorized subagent of OBB, 35 OBB admits that the Eurail pass 
sold by RPE allowed Sachs transport on trains in Austria.36 The pass, howev-
er, bore the instruction: “The issuing office is merely the intermediary of the 
carriers in Europe and assumes no liability from the transport . . . .”37 
 In April 2007, Sachs was severely injured while attempting to board a 
train in Innsbruck, Austria.38 Sachs fell onto the tracks where a moving train 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (defining commercial activity as either a regular course of com-
mercial conduct or a regular commercial transaction or act); accord 14A WRIGHT & MILLER ET 
AL., supra note 26, § 3662.3 (“If the activity is one that normally could be engaged in by a private 
party . . . a foreign sovereign is not absolutely immune from liability therefor . . . . [I]t is the nature 
rather than the purpose of the foreign state’s activity that is determinative . . . .”). 
 28 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (defining “a commercial activity carried on in the United States” 
as one having substantial contact with the United States). 
 29 See Sun v. Taiwan, 201 F.3d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that based upon has 
been interpreted by the Ninth Circuit to mean having a nexus between the commercial activity and 
the legal claims). 
 30 Opening Brief for Appellant at 4, Sachs II, 695 F.3d 1021 (No. 11-15458). 
 31 See id. at 5. 
 32 Id. at 1.  
 33 See Brief for Defendant-Appellee OBB Personenverkehr AG at 3, 5, Sachs II, 695 F.3d 
1021 (No. 11-15458) (explaining that the Republic of Austria, through the Austrian Federal Min-
istry of Transport, Innovation and Technology, wholly owns a joint-stock company, OBB Holding 
Group, which itself wholly owns OBB). 
 34 Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 5–6. 
 35 Compare id. at 4 (“[Sachs] alleged that she purchased the railway ticket through defend-
ants’ agent, Eurail, and the American based company, The Rail Pass Experts . . . .”), with Brief for 
Defendant-Appellee, supra note 33, at 7 (“[T]he Rail Pass Experts is a company based in Massa-
chusetts, and may or may not have been a general sales agent accredited by the Eurail Group and 
thus able to sell Eurail passes.”). 
 36 Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 5. 
 37 Id.  
 38 Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 588. 
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crushed her legs.39 She required amputation of both legs above the knee.40 
Two days prior to the accident, Sachs visited the Innsbruck train station, pre-
sented the reservation sold to her by RPE, which bore a RPE stamp, and pur-
chased a couchette reservation seat upgrade directly from OBB.41 The cou-
chette reservation was not processed as a new transaction, but rather as an 
upgrade to Sachs’s existing pass.42 
C. Journey Through the Courts 
As a result of her injuries, Sachs sued OBB in the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California.43 OBB moved to dismiss the claims on 
sovereign immunity grounds.44 The district court granted OBB’s motion, 
concluding that OBB had not carried on commercial activity in the United 
States.45 The district court reasoned that a principal-agent relationship did not 
exist between RPE and OBB and, therefore, RPE’s commercial activity in the 
United States—the sale of the Eurail pass—could not be imputed to OBB.46 
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a split 
three-judge panel affirmed.47 The dissenting judge, however, argued that RPE 
acted as a subagent of OBB and accordingly, its sale of the Eurail pass could 
be imputed to OBB such that OBB carried on commercial activity in the 
United States.48 Additionally, the dissenting judge concluded that Sachs’s 
claims were based upon the sale of the Eurail pass.49  
The Ninth Circuit ordered rehearing en banc to clarify (1) whether a 
principal-agent relationship existed between RPE and OBB such that RPE’s 
sale of the Eurail pass could be imputed to OBB, and (2) whether Sachs’s 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. Although Sachs’s Eurail pass from RPE would have enabled her to board the train and 
sit in an unassigned seat, Sachs opted to reserve a couchette bed by paying an upgrade fee directly 
to OBB. See id. 
 42 See id. at 588, 601. 
 43 See Sachs I, 2011 WL 816854, at *1. Sachs’s claims against OBB included negligence, 
strict liability for design defect, failure to warn about a design defect, breach of implied warranty 
of merchantability, and breach of implied warranty of fitness. See id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at *4; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (2012) (stating that “a commercial activity carried 
on in the United States” is one having substantial contact with the United States). 
 46 Sachs I, 2011 WL 816854, at *3–4. The parties agreed that the sale of the Eurail pass con-
stituted commercial activity under the FSIA. See id. at *2. 
 47 Sachs II, 695 F.3d at 1029. One affirming judge accepted the district court’s reasoning, but 
the other affirming judge, writing separately in a concurring opinion, contended that Sachs’s 
claims were not based upon the sale of the Eurail pass. Compare id. at 1025–26 (opinion of the 
court), with id. at 1030 (Bea, J., concurring). 
 48 Id. at 1032–34 (Gould, J., dissenting).  
 49 Id.  
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claims were based upon the sale of the Eurail pass.50 On rehearing, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, adopting the reasoning propounded by the dissenting panel 
judge.51 Thus, the en banc majority concluded that the commercial activity 
exception was met and subject matter jurisdiction was proper over OBB.52 
OBB subsequently petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.53 The 
Court granted the petition on January 23, 2015.54 
II. ARE YOU MY AGENT? THREE PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING 
WHEN A FOREIGN STATE “CARRIES ON” COMMERCIAL  
ACTIVITY THROUGH AN AGENT 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2013 en banc decision 
in Sachs v. Republic of Austria (“Sachs III”) highlights the confusion sur-
rounding the appropriate legal standard for determining who is an agent or 
subagent of a foreign state when evaluating whether a commercial act was 
carried on in the United States.55 It is essential to know when an entity acts as 
an agent of a foreign state because an agent’s actions can abrogate the sover-
eign immunity typically afforded to the foreign state.56 Just as an employer 
can be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employee, so too can the 
action of a foreign state’s agent be imputed to the foreign state.57 In Sachs III, 
the court considered three standards, including: (1) common law agency, (2) 
the FSIA definition of agency, and (3) the Bancec standard.58 
A. The Common Law 
In Sachs III, the en banc majority favored adoption of common law 
agency principles.59 Under common law agency, a subagent is a third party 
appointed by an agent to perform functions that the agent has agreed to per-
form on behalf of a principal.60 An agent has actual authority to appoint a 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 590–91. 
 51 Id. at 593–94, 598–600; see also Sachs II, 695 F.3d at 1032–34 (Gould, J., dissenting). 
 52 Id. at 603.  
 53 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 135 S.Ct. 1172 (2015) 
(No. 13-1067). 
 54 OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 135 S.Ct. 1172 (2015). 
 55 See 737 F.3d 584, 590–91 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom, OBB Personenverkehr 
AG v. Sachs, 135 S.Ct. 1172 (2015). 
 56 See id. at 603. 
 57 See id. at 593; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 cmt b (2006) (explaining how an 
employer can be held vicariously liable for the tort of an employee). 
 58 See Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 593–95. 
 59 Id. at 593. 
 60 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15 (2006); see, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Miller v. Bill 
Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d. 20, 32 (D.D.C. 2007) (explaining subagency princi-
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subagent when the agent reasonably believes that the principal consents to the 
appointment of a subagent based on a manifestation from the principal.61 A 
principal may expressly or impliedly authorize a subagency.62 A principal im-
pliedly authorizes a subagency when the principal knows, or has reason to 
know, that the agent employs a subagent and takes no action to terminate 
the subagent’s employment.63 Importantly, when a subagent acts, the action 
carries the same legal consequences for the principal as if it were the agent 
acting.64 Thus, where a subagent acts within the scope of a subagency rela-
tionship, the acts are attributable to the principal.65  
In Sachs III, OBB employed Eurail Group to market and sell its rail 
passes.66 Eurail, in turn, enlisted third parties such as RPE to market and sell 
OBB’s rail passes to United States customers.67 The en banc majority held 
that even if OBB did not expressly authorize Eurail Group to employ RPE as 
a subagent-ticket distributor, OBB impliedly authorized the subagency when 
it honored the RPE-stamped reservation that Sachs presented to purchase her 
couchette upgrade.68 At that point, OBB knew of the subagency and took no 
action to terminate it.69 Thus, the en banc majority concluded that a subagent 
relationship existed between RPE and OBB and RPE’s acts as a subagent 
could be imputed to OBB, its principal.70  
 The en banc majority noted that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit have used 
common law agency to answer other inquiries related to the FSIA commercial 
activity exception.71 In 1987, in Barkanic v. General Administration of Civil 
Aviation of the People’s Republic of China, the Second Circuit held that a 
                                                                                                                           
ples); In re Nat’l Audit Def. Network, 332 B.R. 896, 920 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005) (same); Estate of 
Smith v. Underwood, 487 S.E.2d 807, 816 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (same). 
 61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15 cmt. C (2006). 
 62 Id.; 19 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 54:15 (4th ed. 2002). 
 63 19 LORD, supra note 62, § 54:15. 
 64 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15 cmt d (2006). 
 65 See id. § 7.04. 
 66 Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 587. 
 67 Id. at 593. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See id. (“If RPE had impermissibly sold the Eurail pass to Sachs, OBB would have had no 
duty to honor the pass. But it did. It cannot now sensibly argue that the sale of that pass by RPE in 
the United States was unauthorized.”).  
 70 See id. at 594. The en banc majority also acknowledged arguendo that, if RPE’s sale of the 
Eurail pass was entirely unauthorized, OBB’s decision to honor Sachs’s Eurail pass amounted to 
ratification of the sale. See id. at 593 n.6. A principal ratifies an unauthorized act by expressly 
manifesting assent or by conduct that justifies a reasonable assumption that the principal so con-
sents. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 (2006). When a principal ratifies an unau-
thorized act, the act is treated as if performed with actual authority, that is, attributable to the prin-
cipal. See id. § 4.01 cmt. b.  
 71 See Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 593–94. 
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commercial act was carried on in the United States—thus triggering the com-
mercial activity exception—where the only domestic act was a ticket sale by 
a Washington, D.C. travel agent.72 Relatedly, in 2005, in Kirkham v. Société 
Air France, the D.C. Circuit also held that a ticket sale by a Washington, D.C. 
travel agent satisfied the commercial activity exception.73 In both cases, the 
existence of a subagency or agency relationship was material to the commer-
cial activity exception.74 
Notably, the Ninth Circuit itself has stated that a common law agency re-
lationship can support a commercial activity exception.75 In 1997, in Phaneuf 
v. Republic of Indonesia, the Ninth Circuit held that when a common law 
agent, acting with actual authority, engages in a commercial act, that act can 
be imputed to a foreign state-principal such that the foreign state carried on 
commercial activity.76 In Phaneuf, however, the Ninth Circuit stressed that an 
act may only be attributed to a foreign state-principal where the agent acts 
with actual, and not apparent, authority.77 Thus, the Ninth Circuit had already 
held that acts of a common law agent could be imputed to a foreign state-
principal to demonstrate the foreign state carried on commercial activity, even 
before so holding in Sachs III.78 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See 822 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1987). In Barkanic, a Chinese state-owned airline expressly 
authorized Pan American Worldwide Airways to act as its general sales agent in the United States 
with authority to select and appoint United States ticket agents. See id. at 12. Pan American, in 
turn, expressly authorized a Washington, D.C. travel agent to sell the airline’s tickets to United 
States customers. See id. 
 73 See 429 F.3d 288, 293 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In Kirkham, the French state-owned airline, Air 
France, conceded that the ticket sale by the Washington D.C. travel agent—the only commercial 
act at issue—constituted commercial activity by Air France in the United States. See id. Logically, 
this concession is predicated on Air France’s acknowledgement that the travel agent functioned as 
Air France’s common law agent, acting with the airline’s actual authority. See id. 
 74 See Kirkham, 429 F.3d at 293; Barkanic, 822 F.2d at 12–13; see also Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 
592 n.5 (explaining that although the parties conceded agency relationships existed in both cases, 
the circuit courts each had an independent duty to assess jurisdiction and implicitly accepted the 
agency relationships as valid by not holding otherwise). 
 75 See Phaneuf v. Rep. Indon., 106 F.3d 302, 307–08 (9th Cir. 1997). In Phaneuf, a holder of 
promissory notes issued by the National Defense Security Council of the Republic of Indonesia sued 
to enforce payment after the Indonesian government declared the notes invalid. See id. at 304. 
 76 See id.  
 77 See id. at 308 (“If the foreign state has not empowered its agent to act, the agent’s unau-
thorized act cannot be attributed to the foreign state; there is no ‘activity of the foreign state.’”). 
Conversely, apparent authority exists when a third party reasonably believes the agent has authori-
ty to act and that belief is traceable to the manifestations of the principal. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006).   
 78 See Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 593; Phaneuf, 106 F.3d at 307–08. 
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B. The FSIA Definition 
In Sachs III, the en banc court divided over how to interpret statutory 
terms.79 The en banc dissent argued that the Ninth Circuit should have looked 
exclusively to the definition of agency within the FSIA to determine whether 
RPE was an agent of OBB.80 Within the meaning of the FSIA, a “foreign 
state” includes a political subdivision or an “agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state.”81 The en banc majority, however, held that the statutory lan-
guage was relevant insofar as determining which entities may claim sovereign 
immunity, not whether acts of an agent can be imputed to a principal—a con-
cept historically addressed by the common law.82  
C. The Bancec Standard 
As an alternative to the FSIA definition of agency, the dissent in Sachs 
III argued that the standard set forth in First National City Bank v. Banco El 
Comercio Exterior de Cuba (“Bancec”) should control.83 In 1983, in Bancec, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that instrumentalities created by a foreign state 
could be liable for acts of the foreign state (1) where a corporate entity is so 
extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent 
is created, or (2) when recognizing the separateness would work fraud or in-
justice.84 Although Bancec addressed liability, the Ninth Circuit embraced the 
                                                                                                                           
 79 Compare 737 F.3d at 595 (majority opinion) (holding statutory definition inapposite), with 
id. at 605–07 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (favoring extension of statutory definition). 
 80 See id. at 605 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). Section 1603 of the FSIA defines the term 
“agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012). The en banc dissent 
contended that the presumption of consistent usage cannon of statutory interpretation requires the 
definition provided in section 1603 apply equally to questions of immunity discussed in section 
1604 and the exceptions addressed in section 1605, though the former specifically employs the 
term “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” while the latter does not. Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 
606 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).  
 81 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)–(b). The statute defines “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” 
as “[A]ny entity—(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an 
organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other 
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is 
neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined [herein], nor created under the laws of 
any third country.” Id. 
 82 See Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 595 (majority opinion). The en banc majority points to other 
canons of statutory interpretation, namely the surplusage canon, the harmonious reading canon, 
the associated words canon, and the prior construction canon, which all support application of 
common law agency principles for purposes of the commercial activity exception. See id. at 598 
n.13. Importantly, the prior construction canon instructs that where a statute uses a term that has 
already been interpreted by a court of last resort, the term is to be understood in light of such con-
struction. See id. 
 83 Id. at 607 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
 84 See 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983). Bancec considered whether the official bank of Cuba could 
be liable for acts taken by Cuba, a slightly different inquiry from Sachs III, which asks whether 
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two-tier Bancec standard in 2009, in Doe v. Holy See, to determine when acts 
of a third party could be attributed to a foreign state for the purpose of estab-
lishing subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA.85 Because Bancec was 
decided on equitable grounds under the test’s second prong, Holy See clari-
fied that the first prong of the Bancec standard is met where the foreign state 
engages in day-to-day or routine involvement in the affairs of the other enti-
ty.86  In Sachs III, the en banc dissent argued that application of the Bancec 
standard would align with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Holy See.87 The en 
banc majority, however, reasoned that the Bancec standard was inapposite 
because both Bancec and Holy See involved corporate affiliates that were 
tied via a corporate relationship, quite unlike the situation in Sachs where 
OBB and RPE shared no corporate ties.88  
III. RECOMMENDED APPROACH: THE COMMON LAW 
The U.S. Supreme Court, on review, should follow the majority opinion 
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2013 en banc decision 
in Sachs v. Republic of Austria (“Sachs III”) and hold that common law 
agency principles inform whether a foreign state carries on commercial ac-
tivity in the United States.89 The Court should acknowledge that the question 
of whether a foreign state carries on commercial activity through an agent is 
different from one that asks whether an agent of a foreign state is entitled to 
sovereign immunity.90 The Court should look to the plain language of the 
FSIA, its legislative history, and case law from two U.S. Courts of Appeals to 
conclude that Congress intended the statute to incorporate broad common law 
                                                                                                                           
the foreign state, Austria, retains liability for transactions entered into by a state-owned common 
carrier. See id. at 613, 629; Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 590–91. 
 85 See Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 
607 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). In Holy See, a parishioner alleged sexual abuse against Holy 
See, its instrumentalities, and its agents. See 557 F.3d at 1070. Holy See, as the ecclesiastical, 
governmental, and administrative arm of the Roman Catholic Church, is treated as a foreign state. 
See id. 
 86 Holy See, 557 F.3d  at 1079 .  
 87 See Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 607 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).  
 88 See id. at 594 (majority opinion); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 67 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
corporate affiliates as a subsidiary, parent, or sibling corporation); see also Walkovsky v. Carlton, 
223 N.E.2d 6, 7–8 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1966) (explaining the legal principle of piercing the corporate 
veil, under which a parent corporation may be held liable for the intentional or negligent wrong-
doing of its subsidiary). 
 89 See 737 F.3d 584, 596 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom, OBB Personenverkehr AG v. 
Sachs, 135 S.Ct. 1172 (2015). 
 90 See id. at 595; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 15 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 
1614 (“An entity which does not fall within the definitions of [agency or instrumentality of a for-
eign state] would not be entitled to sovereign immunity in any case before a Federal or State 
court.”) (emphasis added).  
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agency principles into the carried on analysis.91 Thus, the Court should find 
that the FSIA does not displace common law agency principles and, further, 
should hold that actions of a common law agent—or relatedly, a common law 
subagent—may be imputed to a foreign state-principal.92 
The Court should also recognize that common sense dictates adoption of 
the common law approach as opposed to the approaches favored by the Sachs 
III dissent.93 If courts applied the FSIA definition, a foreign state-owned 
common carrier would be afforded immunity, and thus would be consistently 
exempt from liability, in any circumstance where the passenger’s ticket was 
purchased from a travel agent that is not majority-owned by the foreign 
state.94 Similarly, if courts adopted the Bancec standard—also advocated for 
by the Sachs III dissent—a foreign state-owned common carrier would be 
exempted from liability in any circumstance where the passenger’s ticket was 
purchased by a travel agent whose day-to-day operations did not include in-
volvement from the foreign state.95 In either case, a foreign state’s sophisti-
cated lawyers could intentionally craft ownership structures to preserve im-
munity.96 Further, under either the FSIA definition or the Bancec standard, 
immunity would not be limited to tort actions, but would extend to contract 
actions as well.97 As the Sachs III majority noted, this could mean that an 
American who purchases a ticket for international travel through an American 
travel agent may find the reservation cancelled but payment retained by the 
foreign state-owned common carrier with no recourse in domestic courts.98 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (2012) (defining “commercial activity carried on in the United 
States by a foreign state” to include commercial acts that have substantial contact with the United 
States) (emphasis added); Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 591 (explaining that the “carried on by” require-
ment should be interpreted in light of broad agency principles); Mar. Int’l Nominees Establish-
ment v. Rep. Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[A] foreign state, in Congress’s 
view, can surrender immunity by virtue of activities committed by an agent, and that, consequent-
ly, the ‘carried on by’ requirement can be interpreted in light of broad agency principles.”); H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1487, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615–16 (“This definition includes 
cases based on commercial transactions performed in whole or in part in the United States . . . . It 
will be for the courts to determine whether a particular commercial activity has been performed in 
whole or in part in the United States.”). 
 92 See Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 595 (“To abrogate common-law principles of agency the FSIA 
‘must speak directly to the question addressed by the common law.’” (quoting United States v. 
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 (1998))). 
 93 See id. at 596–97; cf. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (holding that statutory interpretation must “be guided to a degree by com-
mon sense”). 
 94 See supra note 81 (defining “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state”); cf. Sachs III, 
737 F.3d at 596–97. 
 95 See Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 596–97; supra note 84 and accompanying text (defining the 
Bancec standard). 
 96 Cf. Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 596–97. 
 97 See id. (advancing a similar line of reasoning). 
 98 See id. 
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Moreover, the Court should find it fairer to place the burden on foreign 
state-owned common carriers to monitor entities that sell their tickets than to 
require unsophisticated ticket-purchasers to investigate the ownership struc-
ture or day-to-day operations of any ticket agent or travel agent with whom 
the purchaser transacts.99 Because the foreign state-owned common carrier 
profits from the increased sales reach afforded by a United States ticket agent 
or travel agent, a reciprocal duty to monitor those selling such tickets is not 
particularly onerous.100 Further, it is the carrier, not the ticket purchaser, who 
routinely engages in these transactions and is thus better situated to absorb 
any monitoring costs.101  
 The Court’s decision, however, cannot end the inquiry.102 One chief 
drawback of the common law approach is its lack of uniformity.103 Often, the 
common law varies from state to state.104 Because the FSIA provides the sole 
basis for obtaining subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign state, uniformity 
is essential.105 In an era during which foreign states routinely conduct busi-
ness through domestic common law agents and subagents, Congress should 
clarify a uniform legal standard.106 Broad common law agency principles, 
however, should provide the guiding framework.107  
                                                                                                                           
 99 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (Tray-
nor, J., concurring) (suggesting a seller is better equipped than a buyer to absorb and spread costs 
associated with an injury from a defective product); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D 
(1965) (stating a plaintiff does not assume the risk of harm unless aware of the risk and appreci-
ates its character); Paula J. Dalley, All in a Day’s Work: Employers’ Vicarious Liability for Sexual 
Harassment, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 517, 529 (2002) (explaining advantages of loss spreading); Da-
vid J. Molnar, Should Loss-Spreading Be the Paramount Public Policy Rationale for the Imposi-
tion of Strict Products Liability? A Study of the Intersection of Strict Products Liability and Land-
lord-Tenant Law, 22 J. CORP. LAW. 93, 102 (1996) (same). 
 100 See Molnar, supra note 99, at 102. 
 101 See Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–41 (Traynor, J., concurring) (noting that, whereas “[t]he cost 
of an injury . . . may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured,” providers of services 
and products are better situated to absorb such costs because “the risk of injury can be insured . . . 
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business”). 
102 See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 3, OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 135 S.Ct. 1172 (2015) 
(No. 13-1067) (arguing that varying state interpretations of common law agency may present 
challenges in application of federal immunity law). 
 103 See id.; cf. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (holding that a feder-
al court sitting in diversity should not reach a particular outcome solely because of the state in 
which it sits). 
 104 Cf. 14A WRIGHT & MILLER ET AL., supra note 26, § 4514 (noting the absence of a federal 
common law). 
 105 See Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 102, at 3. 
 106 See id. 
 107 See Sachs III, 737 F.3d at 591 (urging application of broad common law agency principles 
in carried on analysis). 
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CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sachs v. 
Republic of Austria (“Sachs III”) illustrates the confusion surrounding the 
appropriate legal standard for determining who is an agent or subagent of a 
foreign state when evaluating whether a commercial act was carried on in the 
United States under the FSIA commercial activity exception. In Sachs III, the 
en banc majority embraced common law agency principles and rejected both 
the FSIA definition of agency and the Bancec standard. On review, the U.S. 
Supreme Court should find that common law agency principles best align 
with congressional intent and important policy goals. The common law, how-
ever, is problematic because it varies from state to state. Because the FSIA 
requires uniformity among all domestic federal jurisdictions, Congress should 
ultimately clarify a uniform standard that incorporates broad common law 
agency principles in line with the decision in Sachs III.   
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